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Abstract 
Concerns about a possible turn of the global trade policy agenda are on the rise. Indeed, 
even if tariffs are at a historically low levels, non-tariff measures (NTMs) play an important – 
and growing – role in global trade policy. In this paper, using a recently released database on 
NTMs (UNCTAD), and relying on a gravity model, we focus on Chinese exports with two 
aims in mind: the first is to test for possible heterogeneous effects of different type of NTMs. 
The second is to verify empirically whether NTMs have larger negative effects for specific set 
of goods, i.e. final goods. We find that 1) technical NTMs tend to have positive effects on 
trade flows, whereas non-technical NTMs do not have clear effects at the aggregate level 
and 2) NTMs have heterogeneous effects at the product level: in the case of final goods, 
non-technical NTMs have negative and significant effects. 
Keywords: international trade, trade policy, non-tariff measures, gravity model, China. 
JEL Classification: F13, F14. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Las preocupaciones sobre un posible giro de la agenda de la política comercial mundial van en 
aumento. De hecho, incluso si los aranceles se encuentran en niveles históricamente bajos, las 
medidas no arancelarias (MNA) desempeñan un papel importante, y creciente, en la política 
comercial mundial. En este documento, utilizando una base de datos recientemente publicada, 
y que contiene información sobre las MNA (UNCTAD) y utilizando en un modelo de gravedad, 
nos centramos en las exportaciones de China con dos objetivos en mente: el primero es evaluar 
posibles efectos heterogéneos de diferentes tipos de MNA. El segundo es verificar 
empíricamente si las MNA tienen efectos negativos más marcados para un conjunto específico 
de bienes, es decir, los bienes finales. Encontramos que 1) las MNA técnicas tienden a tener 
efectos positivos en los flujos comerciales, mientras que las MNA no técnicas no tienen efectos 
claros a nivel agregado y 2) las MNA tienen efectos heterogéneos a nivel del producto: en el 
caso de los bienes finales, las MNA no técnicas tienen efectos negativos y significativos. 
Palabras clave: comercio internacional, política comercial, medidas no arancelarias, modelos 
de gravedad, China. 
Códigos JEL: F13, F14. 
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1 Introduction 
The World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) recently released a joint report (2017) warning against the turn of the global trade policy 
agenda.  Indeed, in a context of  erratic global trade developments, policy issues returned in 
the spotlight both in politics and academia (Feng et al., 2017; Nicita and Murina, 2017; Baccini 
et al., forthcoming; Blanchard et al., 2016; Conconi et al., 2016; Haaland and Venables, 2016; 
Baldwin, 2011; Antras and Yeaple, 2013; Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2010). Even if tariffs are 
at historically low levels, non-tariff measures (NTMs) play an important – and growing – role in 
global trade policy, as certified by the burgeoning interest of international governmental and 
non-governmental bodies (i.a. Cadot and Malouche, 2012; UN, 2013; WTO, 2012; GTA, 2018), 
and their impacts on trade are potentially more complex than those of tariffs. 
Figure 1: NTMs, 1996-2016 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on i-tip.wto.org. 
Note: “NTMs” represents the sum of all different NTMs initiated and in force in a specific year, using a flow approach. 
 
Theoretical and empirical work on NTMs provides mixed results. As brilliantly 
summarised by Fugazza (2013), from a theoretical perspective it is ambiguous how certain type 
of NTMs (e.g. technical regulations) may affect exporters’ and importers’ behaviour, and 
therefore trade (see also Bertola and Faini, 1990, with special emphasis on quotas). On the 
empirical side, the recent literature has largely concentrated on the effect of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPS, a subset of technical measures) on trade, with overwhelming 
attention to agricultural products (e.g. Nicita and Murina, 2017; Ferro et al., 2015; Melo et al., 
2015; whereas Fontagné et al, 2015, cover the entire spectrum of HS-4 sectors; Gibson and 
Wang, 2018). 
There are no clear-cut results: at the aggregated level (using panel data including 
different exporting countries), the effect of NTMs on trade is mixed at best (Ghodsi et al., 2017; 
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Hayakawa et al., 2016). We therefore decided to focus on China, the world biggest exporter. 
Increasing competition from China has been pointed as one of the causes that reinvigorated 
the recent revival of trade policy measures, with accuses of being the driver of increases in 
unemployment (Autor et al., 2013), lower wages (Ashournia et al., 2014), or affecting political 
and electoral patterns (see Colantone and Stanig, forthcoming (a); Colantone and Stanig, 
forthcoming (b); Che et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016).1 
In this paper, using a new measure of NTMs (Nicita and Murina, 2017), a recently 
released database (UNCTAD, 2017), and relying on gravity models (Baier and Bergstrand, 
2007; Head and Mayer, 2014; Glick and Rose, 2016; UNCTAD-WTO; 2016), we focus on 
Chinese exports with two aims in mind: the first is to disentangle the effects of destination 
country’s NTMs on Chinese exports. Due to possible heterogeneous effects of different NTMs 
on trade flows, we separate NTMs measures by groups, i.e. technical (mainly product 
regulations to promote certain standards) and non-technical (i.e. anti-dumping and other 
measures inclined to shelter domestic producers from import competition) measures 
(UNCTAD, 2015). In addition, we also aim to measure empirically whether NTMs have 
heterogeneous effects for specific sets of goods. Indeed, focusing trade policy on intermediate 
goods would rise input costs and possibly disrupt global value chains. Oppositely, following 
political economy arguments (Baccini et al., forthcoming), we would expect final goods to be 
the focus of more restrictive NTMs, as they induce tougher import competition (Amiti and 
Konings, 2007). Final goods may report larger NTMs effects also because of a higher degree of 
substitutability (Jones, 2011). 
We find that – at least in the case of measures related with Chinese exports– 
measuring NTMs as a uniform aggregate may be misleading. NTMs have heterogeneous 
effects on trade. A first type of heterogeneity is at NTMs level: whereas technical NTMs tend to 
have positive effects on trade flows (likely to be demand-driven), non-technical NTMs do not 
have clear effects (having a negative but not significant coefficient). In addition, NTMs have 
heterogeneous effects also at the product level: in particular, non-technical NTMs have 
negative effects for final goods. As outlined above, this may be due to political economy 
reasons or heterogeneous substitution effects. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II revises the relevant literature 
on gravity models, NTMs and the political economy of trade policy. Section III explains our 
methodological choice and provide the relevant details. Section IV briefly describes data used. 
Section V analyses the main results and their robustness. Section VI concludes. 
                                                                          
1  A parallel strand of literature estimate welfare effects related to “China’s trade shock”, finding aggregate welfare gains 
(Feenstra and Weinstein, 2017), however with considerable within-state variance (Caliendo et al., 2015).  
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2 Literature Review 
The prominence of trade costs within international trade theory served as a natural magnet for 
many applied economists investigating its influences on trade flows (and economic growth). 
With the changing trend in relative importance between tariffs and NTMs during the last 
decades, the need of explicitly account for the latter in models and estimations became 
indisputable. However, NTMs are heterogeneous and complex in nature, often having legal 
origins, and their measurement is inherently difficult. Anderson and Neary (2003) provide one of 
the few comprehensive attempts to estimate NTMs, through a “Mercantilist Trade 
Restrictiveness Index” (MTRI) which would represent “the uniform tariff which yields the same 
volume of imports as a given tariff structure” (p.27).2 Using the theoretical approach of 
Anderson and Neary (2003) as a reference, Kee et al. (2009) elaborated an “Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index” (OTRI) (see also i.a. Nicita and Olarreaga, 2008; Irwin, 2010). The OTRI 
combines tariffs with anti-dumping (AD) duties data (which only represents a fraction of the 
NTMs family), allowing to calculate a weighted average ad-valorem correspondent for tariffs 
and AD duties at country level, where weights depends on imported-product level 
characteristics, such as volume composition and demand elasticities.3 The high level of data 
requirements limited the OTRI replicability, and currently comparable data exist for 2008 and 
2009 only. Using these data, Kee et al.  (2014) argues that trade policy faced no dramatic 
change between 2008 and 2009. They reached this conclusion plotting against each other the 
OTRI level in the two available years. At that time, AD duties were available for 13 countries.    
Since then, data collection efforts have increased exponentially,4 opening a wide set of 
opportunities for researchers. So far, results estimating the NTMs effects on trade have proved 
to be mixed (Ghodsi et al., 2017). Moreover, very few examples provide internationally 
comparable results, and most of them focus on agriculture. For example, Ferro et al. (2015) 
use “maximum residue level of pesticides” as a proxy for restrictiveness dictated by NTMs, 
finding a negative relation with exports in more regulated markets. Melo et al. (2014) find 
heterogeneous effects of regulation on Chilean fresh fruit exports. Fontagné et al. (2015) use 
French firm level data to detect a negative impact of trade barriers (sample restricted to SPS) 
on both margins of exports. Kirpichev and Moral-Benito (2018), using a panel of Spanish firms,  
found that newly introduced NTMs do not only have negative effects on export growth, but also 
on other firm dimensions (e.g. productivity). In parallel, another strand of literature points toward 
a positive effect of specific certification measures and other standards, mainly on imports from 
                                                                          
2  In parallel, in a quest for coherent variables available for properly identifying a reduction in trade costs, a part of the 
literature focused on free trade agreements (FTAs) and currency unions (CUs), as they are expected to reduce trade 
costs. Concretely, FTAs are supposed to influence tariffs and NTMs. Most of the studies find a clear positive relation 
with FTAs and bilateral trade flows, but do not differentiate its drivers, including a dummy variable that identifies 
dichotomously the existence of an agreement and the eventual membership of the two countries involved in bilateral 
trade (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Philippidis and Sanjuán, 2007; Hayakawa and Kimura, 2015; Caporale et al., 
2009; Kawasaki, 2015; Thorbecke, 2015a; Freeman and Pienknagura, 2016). CUs instead, are expected to reduce 
transaction costs, favouring trade. Rose’s seminal contribution (2000) – together with Glick and Rose (2002) – 
calculating the effects of the use of a common currency on bilateral trade flows started a buoyant discussion on 
methods and techniques for minimising the potential estimation errors. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) provide a detailed 
survey, highlighting the famous “gold, silver and bronze” errors and how to avoid them, while still applying gravity 
models. Rose (2017) and Glick and Rose (2016) recently summarised the results and provides new estimates for the 
entry and exit effects. For historical evidence on currency unions and trade see, i.a., Flandreau (2000), López-Córdova 
and Meissner (2003) and Timini (2018).  
3 A precursor of this index was the TRI elaborated by the IMF in its review for the “Trade Liberalization in IMF-Supported 
Programs (EBS/97/163). Used mainly for managerial purposes, it has not been exempted by critics as some biases 
arose in the way tariffs and NTMs were rated. 
4 See data section for more details 
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developing countries (e.g. Henson and Humprey, 2009; Henson et al., 2011; Murina and Nicita, 
2017). Trimarchi (2018), focusing on anti-dumping measures, and Leonardi and Meschi (2016) 
extend these positive effects to the labour market. Among these, Murina and Nicita (2017) 
exploits the rich UNCTAD-TRAINS database in a disaggregated fashion, using a cross-section 
perspective, focussing on the effect of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on 
agricultural imports in the EU market, and how the level of development in the country of origin 
may affect the capacities for compliance (the higher the income, the lower the difficulty of 
meeting the required standards). 
Nevertheless, despite its role in the world economy, there is no work focusing on the 
whole set of NTMs for the specific case of Chinese exports. Imbruno (2016) examines its 
imports and assesses the effectiveness of a group of trade policy instruments since the 
Chinese accession to the WTO. Caporale et al. (2016) instead, analyses exports to the main 
destinations, and its relationship with the Chinese industrial structure, using aggregate data, 
and not including in the gravity model any proxies for NTMs. Chandra (2016) offers a view on 
the effect of US imposed temporary trade barriers, finding negative spillovers on  Chinese 
exports (including those to third countries).5 Finally, using data for Chinese exports of fruit and 
vegetables, Gibson and Wang (2018) focus on SPS measures and trade intermediaries, finding 
a positive association between NTMs and exports. 
Our contribution is to consider the entire spectrum of exports and NTMs at the finest 
(internationally comparable) level of detail while, at the same time, allowing for possible 
heterogeneous effects at the NTM and product type level. Indeed, the diversity within NTMs 
(technical and non-technical measures) and product (final vs. intermediate and capital) types 
emphasize the need for allowing such heterogeneity to be taken into account empirically. 
In other words, we aim to estimate the effects of NTMs on Chinese exports, at 
product-country level, differentiating by NTMs (i.e. between technical and non-technical 
measures) and by product classification (i.e. final and non-final good). The reasons for doing 
so are threefold: first, we aim to estimate the effects of the NTMs imposed by destination 
countries on Chinese exports. Second, we aim to take into account and disentangle possible 
heterogeneous effects of different NTMs. Indeed, in some cases, demand side effects may 
be positive: for example consumers may buy more products with higher regulatory 
requirements as they will reflect more sophisticated health, safety, and possibly also 
environmental protection standards (e.g. Nicita and Murina, 2017). Supply side effects may 
not be necessarily negative, if regulation does not directly aim to shield producers from 
import competition (as in case, for example of SPS measures, and other “technical” 
measures, as defined by UNCTAD, 2015). Nevertheless, if the final aim of NTMs is to shelter 
domestic producers, it is highly likely to have negative effects on the supply side (e.g. those 
NTMs classified by UNCTAD, 2015, as non-technical, i.e. anti-dumping and other measures 
inclined to shelter domestic producers from import competition, which translates in 
measures ranges from “contingent trade-protective” to “non-automatic licensing, quotas, 
prohibitions and quantity control”, and from “trade-related investment” to “government 
procurement restrictions”). Moreover, we want to test for the possible existence of “political 
economy” arguments or heterogeneous substitution effects: NTMs may be more restrictive in 
some cases (i.e. have larger negative/positive effects for a specific set of goods). Indeed, 
trade policies focusing on intermediate goods would rise input costs and possibly disrupt 
global value chains. Oppositely, following political economy arguments (Baccini et al., 
                                                                          
5    For more information on temporary trade barriers and the relative database, see e.g. Bown and Crowley (2016) 
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forthcoming), we would expect final goods to be the focus of non-technical NTMs as they 
induce tougher import competition (Amiti and Konings, 2007). However, the same effects 
may be derived from a different degree of substitutability across product types: this would 
explain that the same number of NTMs may have, for example, more detrimental effects on 
final goods if these are more easily substitutable than intermediate goods. Due to the nature 
of the data in our possession, we cannot disentangle the two theories. 
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3 Methodology 
In our methodological approach, we follow Head and Mayer (2014) and UNCTAD-WTO (2012) 
using an augmented gravity model, inclusive of multilateral trade resistances (MTRs) theorised 
by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), an issue that some studies on NTMs failed to properly 
take into account. To properly address the “zeros of trade”, as standard in the literature, we 
implemented a pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood estimating procedure (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). We use disaggregated bilateral trade flows data.6 Therefore, our main 
specification can be written as follow: 
ܶݎ௝௞௧ = exp (ߚ଴ + ߚܺᇱ௝௞௧ + ߣܹᇱ௝௞௧ + ⍵ ௝ܼ௧ + ߜ௝ + ߛ௦௘௖௧௢௥ + ߟ௧) + ௝߳௞௧ (1) 
where ܶݎ௝௞  denotes nominal Chinese exports of product k to country j. ܺ′ is a vector which 
contains trade policy related variables: 1) ܶܽݎ݂݅ ௝݂௞ , which is the effectively applied tariff 
reported by each destination country j for a specific product k (in logarithm). 2) ܴܫ௝௞, which is 
a proxy for NTMs, as firstly implemented in Murina and Nicita (2017), reflecting the 
“regulatory intensity” for product k in country j. The regulatory intensity index is calculated by 
simply considering the number of NTMs that are applied to imports of a particular product 
coming from China. For example, if the product corresponding to the Harmonised System 
(HS) 6-digit category 611019 (“Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats & similar articles, 
knitted/crocheted, of fine animal hair other than of Kashmir [cashmere] goats”) faces nine 
different measures in country A, the corresponding ܴܫ஺଺ଵଵ଴ଵଽ will be equal to nine. Following 
Nicita and Murina (2017), in the main specification we include the RI in log, but we run a 
series of robustness tests using alternative functional forms. Following the same 
methodology and to account for eventual contrasting effects, we also calculated the ܴܫ௝௞ 
separately for technical (RI-tech) and non-technical measures (RI-nontech).7 In addition, we 
include a vector ܹ′, which contains other relevant variables: 1) ݂݈݅݊ܽ௞, defined as in 
Martínez-Zarzoso and Johannsen (2016), i.e. a dummy =1 in case product k is not an 
intermediate nor a capital good following BEC classification. In addition, we include in the 
regressions two interaction terms, between the  ݂݈݅݊ܽ ݃݋݋݀௞ dummy and RI-tech and RI-
nontech, respectively, to test for the possible existence of heterogeneous effects for different 
product categories. ܼ′ is a vector containing additional control variables, ݈݊ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧ and ܯܴܫ௝௧. 
݈݊ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧ is the logarithm of the destination country nominal GDP. ܯܴܫ௝௧ is a multilateral 
resistance index8. Indeed, to control for MTRs (as suggested by, inter alia, Head and Mayer, 
2014; Feenstra, 2016; Shepherd, 2016; Anderson, 2011; and UNCTAD-WTO, 2016), we 
follow the method proposed by Carrère et al. (2010), widely used in the literature, e.g. Cirera 
                                                                          
6   French (2014) highlights sub-optimal estimation performances of aggregated models with respect to trade barriers, as 
composition of trade flows matters. 
7  NTMs technical and non-technical measures are classified following UNCTAD (2015), also called UN MAST 
classification. Technical measures include: chapters A to C, i.e. sanitary and phytosanitary measures; technical 
barriers to trade; pre-shipment inspection and other formalities. Non-technical measures include: chapters D to O, 
i.e. contingent trade-protective measures; non-automatic licensing, quotas, prohibitions and quantity-control 
measures other than for SPS or TBT reasons; price-control measures, including additional taxes and charges; 
finance measures; measures affecting competition; trade-related investment measures; distribution restrictions; 
restrictions on post-sales services; subsidies (excluding export subsidies); government procurement restrictions; 
intellectual property; rules of origin.  
8    ܯܴܫ௜௧ = ∑ ௒ೕ೟௒ೢ ೟ ln (ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝)
௡௝ୀଵ , where ௪ܻ௧  is the world output at time t (for an explanation of the variables included in the 
equation, see text) 
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et al. (2016).9 As a further control for endogeneity issues, we included pseudo-pair fixed 
effects, ߜ௝,10 the use of which automatically exclude the possibility of obtaining separate 
estimates for the standard “gravity-related” variables. However, this would have only been a 
second-best strategy to (partly) control for trade costs. Finally,  ߛ௦௘௖௧௢௥ represents two-digit 
sector fixed effects, ߟ௧ are time fixed effects, and ௝߳௞௧ the error term. 
                                                                          
9  The procedure to estimate MTRs suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2009), coherent with the Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003) theoretical framework, is highly data intensive (see i.a. Head et al., 2010; Melitz and Toubal, 2014 for a 
practical application; and Baltagi et al., 2014 for a theoretical discussion). 
10 Due to the lack in exporter variance, importer fixed effects correspond to pair-fixed effects in our database. 
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4 Data 
Our quantitative analysis exploits a new dataset generated by a variety of different sources. We 
follow Schindler and Beckett (2005) and Day (2015), including Chinese export data in the 
database mirroring import data from destination countries. Data on trade flows and tariffs come 
from UN COMTRADE (through the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions data platform 
– WITS).11 On the NTMs side, there has been a recent explosion of interest. Data collection has 
follow accordingly. Indeed, at least three major projects delivered (public) databases containing 
internationally comparable information on NTMs. The first, the PRONTO project, is 
comprehensive in its scope: the authors involved created a diverse set of databases (ranging 
from Export Processing Zones to domestic environmental taxes), of which one is strictly 
dedicated to “measuring the incidence of NTMs” (NTM-MAP),12 at the HS 2 digit level. The 
second, the Global Trade Alert database, contains rich information, devoting “particular 
attention to the policy choices of the G-20 economies”,13 on NTMs “flows”, i.e. the change in 
NTMs barriers. The information is collected by teams of international trade experts, i.e. it is not 
“official” strictu sensu. More importantly (at least from the perspective of our analysis), it does 
not provide information on the NTMs “stock” (i.e. how many NTMs for each product were there 
at the beginning of the period). Finally, the third database, is the UNCTAD TRAINS, the “global 
database on NTMs”,14 which provides information at the highest internationally comparable 
level of disaggregation (HS 6 digit) for a large number of countries. Therefore, for NTMs, we 
decided to capitalise on the latter, as it includes information on the NTMs “stock” (the number 
of NTMs imposed by each country at the product level) at the finest internationally comparable 
level of disaggregation (HS 6 digit). In addition, we classified each product by the basic classes 
of goods identified in the System of National Accounts (SNA). Each one of these is related to 
the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification, which makes the equivalence with HS 
classification doable (Miroudot, 2009). GDP and distance data (necessary to calculate the MRI) 
are from CEPII. Limitation in terms of countries are related to both the availability of data for 
NTMs and trade flows at the product level. There are approximately 5,000 product 
observations per country-time,15 including the “zeros of trade”, for a total of more than three 
million observations, for the period 2001-2014: we focus on China since its accession in the 
WTO to the latest available data, as the Chinese integration into the world economy, as far as 
trade is concerned, increased dramatically and the potential for using tariffs have been 
circumscribed into WTO rules. 
 
                                                                          
11 https://wits.worldbank.org/ 
12 More information at: http://pronto.wti.org. 
13 More information at: http://www.globaltradealert.org. 
14 http://trains.unctad.org/. 
15 The member states of the European Union are included in the database as a single country, as the EU trade policy is 
defined at the Union level. See Appendix I for the complete list of countries included in the database. 
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5 Results 
The results from the gravity model, with pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood estimates, are 
presented in Table 1. Column 1 represents a standard specification for panel gravity models 
focussed on understanding the effects of trade policy tools. Beyond the time, sector and 
(pseudo) country-pair fixed effects, it includes the effectively applied tariff variable, which 
reports a negative and significant coefficient. This means, as expected, that a tariff increase in 
country j reduces Chinese exports to country j. Moreover, it also includes the logarithm of the 
destination country GDP and the MRI. Column 2 contains – in addition to the previous 
regression – the regulatory index (RI, we test the robustness of a logarithmic specification in the 
robustness section), including all type of NTMs. The coefficient is positive and significant, 
meaning that, there is an association between higher NTMs and higher trade flows. The 
average result may be driven by positive demand side effects. It can be the case that 
consumers are more willing to buy products with higher regulatory requirements (increasing the 
trade value), in terms of technical standards. However, it is difficult to imagine that non-
technical barriers may have any positive effects. Therefore, in column 3, we allow for 
heterogeneous effects of technical and non-technical NTMs, via two different variables. Indeed, 
we confirm our suspects that the NTMs positive and significant coefficient in column 2 was 
driven by technical NTMs, such as SPS measures. Non-technical NTMs have a negative 
coefficient, although is not significant. Finally, in column 4 we additionally introduce a dummy 
(“final”) and its interaction with both subsets of NTMs (RI-tech and RI-nontech). In this way we 
test for the possible existence of heterogeneous effects for different product subsets: NTMs 
may be more restrictive in some cases (i.e. have larger negative effects for a specific set of 
goods). Indeed, trade policies focusing on intermediate goods would rise input costs and 
possibly disrupt global value chains. Oppositely, following political economy arguments (Baccini 
et al., forthcoming), we would expect final goods to be the focus of non-technical NTMs as 
they induce tougher import competition (Amiti and Konings, 2007). However, final goods may 
report larger NTMs effects also because of a higher degree of substitutability (Jones, 2011). 
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Table 1: Chinese exports, Regulatory Intensity and final goods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lnGDP
MRI
tariff [ln(1+tariff)]
ln_RI [ln(1+RI)]
RI-tech [ln(1+RI-tech)]
RI-nontech [ln(1+RI-nontech)]
final
final*RI-tech
final*RI-nontech
Observations
Year FE
Sector 2-digit FE
Country-pair FE
0.888*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.098 
(0.128) 
 
-0.152*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3,176,01
2 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.885*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.252** 
(0.124) 
 
-0.148*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.133*** 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3,176,012 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.892*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.255** 
(0.122) 
 
-0.148*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
0.136*** 
(0.037) 
 
0.031 
(0.098) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3,176,012 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.889*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.248** 
(0.122) 
 
-0.163*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
0.138*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.147 
(0.117) 
 
0.462*** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.0276 
(0.055) 
 
-0.517*** 
(0.128) 
 
 
3,176,012 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
     
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Chinese exports. Fixed 
effects and constants not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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5.1 Robustness analysis 
To ensure the robustness of the results, we considered a set of alternative specifications. 
Results are included in Table 2. 
In the first set of robustness tests, we focus on the NTMs functional form. In the main 
regression we included NTMs in logarithm, however there is no agreement yet in the literature. 
Therefore, we test – in column 1 – the incorporation of NTMs as a dummy (=1 if RI-tech and 
RI-nontech are ≥1, respectively), and in levels (column 2). Changing the NTMs functional form 
does not produce any relevant change to our main results. 
In the second set of robustness test, we consider possible geographical and 
institutional peculiarities that may in turn introduce biases in the results. In column 3, we 
address the legitimate concern that “Honk Kong traders distribute a large fraction of China's 
exports” (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004), therefore counting Chinese exports only may be a 
source of bias. Consequently, we combined Chinese with Honk Kong exports for a product k 
to a country j. In column 4, we take into account the prominence and peculiarities of the China-
US trade relationship (Thorbecke, 2015b), running a regression without China-US bilateral data 
to check whether overall results are driven by this subset. In both cases results hold, with 
coefficient equal in sign and significance, and very similar in “size”. In column 5, in line with 
column 4, we exclude trade with the European Union, to check that results are not driven by 
the specificities of this important trade relationship. 
In column 6 we exclude agricultural products from the regression. Even if 
agricultural products constitute a minority of Chinese exports (Zhang, 2006), we aim to prove 
that the NTMs-related effects in this analysis go beyond those typically related to SPS in 
agricultural products (e.g. Gibson and Wang, 2018; Nicita and Murina, 2017; Ferro et al., 
2015; Melo et al., 2015). 
In the last set of robustness test, we address some general issues related to the 
equation specification choice. Therefore, in column 7 we run a regression at 4-digit HS level, 
instead of our preferred choice of 6-digit HS level. In other words, we use trade flows at a 
more aggregated level. This imply some assumptions on tariffs (to have the applied tariff at 
the 4-digit level, we calculate the average effects among 6-digit products) and NTMs (we 
simply sum the number of NTMs across products, assuming there is no equal regulation 
across product). Finally, in column 8, we relax the sector fixed effects, with the introduction 
of 1-digit sector fixed effects. 
It is worth noting that across all specifications, there are no changes in the sign or 
significance of our main variables of interests. 
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Table 2: Robustness tests 
  (1) 
NTMs 
dummy 
(=1 if 
NTM≥1) 
(2) 
NTMs 
In level 
(3) 
+ Honk 
Kong 
(4) 
without US 
(5) 
without EU 
(6) 
without 
agricultural 
goods 
(7) 
4-digit 
(8) 
ߛ at 1 digit 
level  
lnGDP 
 
 
MRI 
 
 
tariff [ln(1+tariff)] 
 
 
RI-tech 
 
 
RI-nontech 
 
 
final 
 
 
final*RI-tech 
 
 
final*RI-nontech 
 
 
 
Observations 
 
Year FE 
Sector 2-digit FE 
Country-pair FE 
0.899*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.273** 
(0.119) 
 
-0.164*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.266*** 
(0.071) 
 
0.078 
(0.115) 
 
0.480*** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.122 
(0.087) 
 
-0.444*** 
(0.124) 
 
 
3,176,012 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.897*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.168 
(0.125) 
 
-0.164*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.0210*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.061 
(0.047) 
 
0.453*** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.0054 
(0.0091) 
 
-0.210*** 
(0.059) 
 
 
3,176,012 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
 
0.770*** 
(0.088) 
 
0.290** 
(0.119) 
 
-0.168*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.137*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.148 
(0.114) 
 
0.450** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.029 
(0.055) 
 
-0.523*** 
(0.125) 
 
 
3,176,012
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
 
0.844*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.358** 
(0.171) 
 
-0.112*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.140** 
(0.056) 
 
0.110 
(0.085) 
 
0.315*** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.050 
(0.065) 
 
-0.316*** 
(0.101) 
 
 
3,113,492
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
 
0.884*** 
(0.095) 
 
0.303* 
(0.156) 
 
-0.169*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.187*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.128 
(0.118) 
 
0.452*** 
(0.031) 
 
0.015 
(0.065) 
 
-0.582*** 
(0.135) 
 
 
3,110,980
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.885*** 
(0.093) 
 
0.265* 
(0.125) 
 
-0.170*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.139*** 
(0.049) 
 
0.149 
(0.118) 
 
0.460*** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.0175 
(0.057) 
 
-0.540*** 
(0.131) 
 
 
2,785,925 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
 
0.892*** 
(0.121) 
 
0.480*** 
(0.163) 
 
-0.140*** 
(0.023) 
 
0.176*** 
(0.034) 
 
0.094 
(0.071) 
 
0.793*** 
(0.035) 
 
-0.054 
(0.042) 
 
-0.260*** 
(0.082) 
 
 
800,947 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
 
0.907*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.304** 
(0.123) 
 
-0.116*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.199*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.186 
(0.115) 
 
0.826*** 
(0.021) 
 
-0.058 
(0.06) 
 
-0.566*** 
(0.127) 
 
 
3,176,012 
 
YES 
1 digit 
YES 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Chinese exports. Fixed effects and constants 
not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, 
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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6 Conclusions 
In this article we estimate the effects of trade policy on Chinese exports, using trade data at the 
highest internationally comparable level of disaggregation (HS 6 digit), with a particular focus on 
NTMs. We show that NTMs have heterogeneous effects on Chinese exports both by NTMs 
group and across product type. Indeed, technical NTMs tend to have positive effects on trade 
flows (likely to be driven by demand-side effects), non-technical NTMs do not have a significant 
effect overall (having a negative but not significant coefficient). Moreover, technical NTMs have 
larger positive effects, as well as non-technical NTMs have negative effects, for final goods. As 
outlined above, this may be due to political economy reasons (Baccini et al., forthcoming): 
trade policies focusing on intermediate goods would rise input costs and possibly disrupt 
global value chains. Oppositely, final goods may be the focus of non-technical NTMs, as they 
induce tougher import competition (Amiti and Konings, 2007). Final goods may report larger 
NTMs effects also because of a higher degree of substitutability (Jones, 2011). 
These conclusions have a twofold relevance for increasing our understanding of trade 
policy effects in general, and NTMs in particular. In the first case, we argue that it is necessary 
to disentangle NTMs by group (at least allowing the technical – non-technical dichotomy to 
emerge) in order to fully grasp the diversity of demand and supply-side effects. In addition, we 
claim that to understand non-technical NTMs effects is necessary to go beyond aggregate 
flows, as these seem to concentrate (i.e. to have stronger effects) on a particular set of 
products, namely final goods. 
Our results call for further research to understand whether NTMs have been used in 
substitution of traditional trade policy tools (e.g. tariffs, quotas, see i.a. Blonigen and Prusa, 
2003; Konings and Vandenbussche, 2005; Ketterer, 2016), particularly focusing on final goods 
to shelter domestic firms from the surge in international competition deriving from the “secular 
decline” of tariff rates. 
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Appendix I 
Table A.I.1: Countries included in the database (ISO 3 digit code) 
Countries 
AFG ARG AUS BEN BFA BOL BRA BRN CAN CHL 
CIV COL CPV CRI CUB ECU ETH EUN GHA GIN 
GMB GTM HND IDN IND JPN KAZ KHM LAO LBR 
LKA MEX MLI MMR MYS NER NGA NIC NPL NZL 
PAK PAN PER PHL PRY RUS SEN SGP SLV TGO 
THA TJK URY USA VEN VNM     
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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